Is it resilient? Nein.
Is it available? Nein.
Is it scalable? Nein.
Is it reliable? Nein.
Does it work? Nein.
Genius Tweet from Marc Volovic @marcvolovic
According to James Mickens [and insert some humor here] …
My point is that security people need to get their priorities straight. The “threat model” section of a security paper resembles the script for a telenovela that was written by a paranoid schizophrenic: there are elaborate narratives and grand conspiracy theories, and there are heroes and villains with fantastic (yet oddly constrained) powers that necessitate a grinding battle of emotional and technical attrition.
In the real world, threat models are much simpler.
Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad.
If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@virus-basket.biz.ru.
But if your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT.
The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them.
In summary, https:// and two dollars will get you a bus ticket to nowhere.
After I drink coffee I show my empty mug to the IT guy and tell him I’ve successfully installed Java.
He hates me.